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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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NO. 45097
Kootenai County Case No.
CR-2015-19464

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Must Anderson’s appeal be dismissed as untimely?

Anderson’s Appeal Should Be Dismissed Because It Is Untimely
Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, Anderson pled guilty to first degree
kidnapping and to aggravated battery, the parties stipulated to the imposition of an aggregate
unified sentence of 32 years, “with a minimum of 12 years fixed/maximum of 15 years fixed,”
and Anderson waived his right to appeal his conviction. (R., pp.90-91.) At sentencing, the state
recommended an aggregate unified sentence of 32 years, with 15 years fixed, and Anderson’s
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counsel recommended an aggregate unified sentence of 32 years, with 12 years fixed. (R.,
pp.105-06.) The district court followed the plea agreement and imposed a unified sentence of 32
years, with 14 years fixed, for first degree kidnapping, and a concurrent sentence of 12 years
fixed for aggravated battery. (R., pp.108-09.) The judgment of conviction was entered on
August 12, 2016. (R., p.108.) On August 23, 2016, Anderson filed a timely Rule 35 motion for
reduction of his sentences, and the district court entered an order denying the motion on October
12, 2016. (R., pp.110-11, 132-33.)
Just over four months later, on February 13, 2017, Anderson filed a motion to clarify
credit for time served. 1 (R., pp.134-35.) On March 8, 2017, the district court entered an
amended judgment of conviction granting Anderson 261 days of credit for time served. (R.,
pp.137-39.) Two days later, on March 10, 2017, the district court entered a second amended
judgment of conviction, specifying the dates for which Anderson earned the 261 days of credit
for time served. (R., pp.140-42.) On April 14, 2017, Anderson filed a notice of appeal timely
only from the amended judgments of conviction. (R., p.143.)
Anderson asserts that the 14-year fixed portion of his sentence is excessive because the
district court “insufficiently considered all the mitigating factors,” that the 14-year fixed portion
of his sentence “violated his Eight Amendment rights” because it “constituted ‘cruel and unusual
punishment,’” and that the district court erred by not sua sponte ordering a psychological
evaluation (despite the fact that, according to the “§ 19-2524 DHW Mental Health Examination
Report,” Anderson did not report any current mental health symptoms, there was no indication
that a serious mental illness was present, and “no additional mental health assessment [was]
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Anderson’s motion is entitled “Amended Motion to Clarify Credit for Time Served”; however,
this appears to be a clerical error as it does not appear that an original motion was ever filed. (R.,
pp.6-8, 134 (emphasis added).)
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necessary” (PSI, pp.80-81 2)). (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-26). This Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider Anderson’s appellate challenges because Anderson did not timely appeal from the
original judgment of conviction.
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) requires an appellant to file a notice of appeal within 42 days
from the entry of judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. The time for an appeal from
any criminal judgment, order or sentence in an action is terminated by the filing of a motion
within fourteen (14) days of the entry of the judgment which, if granted, could affect the
judgment, order or sentence in the action, in which case the appeal period for the judgment and
sentence commences to run upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such
motion. I.A.R. 14(a). The requirement of perfecting an appeal within the 42-day time period is
jurisdictional, and any appeal taken after expiration of the filing period must be dismissed.
I.A.R. 21 (failure to file a notice of appeal within time limits prescribed by appellate rules is
jurisdictional and requires automatic dismissal of the appeal).
The district court entered its judgment of conviction imposing concurrent sentences of 32
years, with 14 years fixed, for first degree kidnapping and 12 years fixed for aggravated battery
on August 12, 2016. (R., p.108.) Although Anderson’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of
sentence, filed 11 days after the entry of judgment, tolled the time to appeal from the judgment
of conviction, the appeal period commenced to run on October 12, 2016 – the date of the clerk’s
filing stamp on the district court’s order denying the motion.

(R., p.132.)

I.A.R. 14(a).

Anderson did not file his notice of appeal until April 14, 2017 – 184 days after the district court
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “ANDERSON,
Travis SC #45097 Sealed.pdf.”
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entered its order denying Anderson’s Rule 35 motion. (R., p.143.) Therefore, Anderson’s
appeal from the judgment of conviction is not timely.
Anderson did timely file his notice of appeal from the district court’s amended judgment
of conviction and its second amended judgment of conviction, entered on March 8, 2017 and
March 10, 2017, respectively. (R., pp.137-43.) The timeliness of Anderson’s appeal from the
amended judgments, however, does not confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain the issues
Anderson raises on appeal. For that, Anderson would have had to raise the issues in an appeal
timely from the original judgment of conviction that actually imposed his sentences. Entry of an
amended judgment that is substantively identical to the original judgment does not enlarge the
period for filing an appeal, and the appellate court does not have jurisdiction to address matters
unaffected by the subsequent judgment. State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 308, 246 P.3d 958,
961 (2010); State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 (Ct. App. 1996).
The district court’s amended judgments of conviction did not alter Anderson’s
convictions or sentences; they simply clarified Anderson’s entitlement to credit for time served
and the dates for which he was entitled to credit. (R., pp.137-42.) As such, the entry of the
amended judgments did not enlarge the time in which Anderson was required to file an appeal
from the original judgment in order to challenge the length and/or severity of his 14-year fixed
sentence or the manner in which it was imposed. Anderson’s appeal would only be considered
timely if he challenged matters actually altered by the amended judgments of conviction; he has
not raised any such issue on appeal. Because Anderson’s appeal is not timely, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider it and it must be dismissed.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to dismiss Anderson’s appeal as untimely.

DATED this 16th day of January, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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